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• In 2016, the GICHD and SIPRI recorded 181 incidents related, or suspected to be

related, to anti-vehicle mines (AVMs)1 in 22 states and territories, an increase of
2 per cent compared to 2015. These incidents caused 423 casualties,2 including 228
injured and 195 killed, a decrease of 29 per cent in comparison to 2015.
• Afghanistan, Cambodia, Mali, Pakistan, and Ukraine were the five states with the

most recorded AVM incidents in 2016. All states, besides Afghanistan, featured
among the top five states with the most incidents in the previous year.
• Afghanistan, Mali, Pakistan, Syria and Ukraine were the states with the highest

casualty rates in 2016. The 101 casualties recorded in Ukraine represent a 4 per cent
increase since 2015 and account for 24 per cent of global casualties.
• In post-conflict situations, 87 per cent of casualties were civilians, while in conflict

© Photo credit: HALO Trust 2006

settings, this number drops to 40 per cent.
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BACKGROUND

PURPOSE AND OBJECTIVES

© Photo credit: HALO Trust

The need for systematic data collection on AVM incidents was first recognised
during joint research by the GICHD and SIPRI for a study on the humanitarian and
developmental impact of anti-vehicle mines published in October 2014.3 As a response,
both organisations have been collecting global data on AVM incidents since 2015 with a
view to improving evidence on and identifying trends in AVM impact. Data are available
on interactive and regularly updated online maps.4
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Background

This report presents and analyses AVM incident data from 2016. It follows up on and
compares findings with a first report of its kind: “Global Mapping and Analysis of AntiVehicle Mine Incidents in 2015”, released in April 2016.5

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
Data in this report stem from field reports from states, mainly national mine action
authorities/centres, as well as mine action and other humanitarian organisations, and
from media reviews in Arabic, English, French, Portuguese, Russian, Spanish and Urdu.

FIGURE 1

SOURCES OF AVM INCIDENTS6
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© GICHD – SIPRI

Out of a total of 181 recorded incidents in 2016, 79 are based on field reports from
45 mine action programmes and organisations, and 102 from media sources. A more
detailed description of the methodology and challenges of this research is available in
Annex 1.

Background

|

7

GLOBAL TRENDS 2016

The GICHD and SIPRI recorded 181 incidents in 2016 that were related or suspected
to be related to AVMs in 22 states and territories.7 This represents a minor increase
compared to 2015, when 178 incidents were recorded in 25 states and territories.8
The highest number of incidents were found in Ukraine, Mali, Afghanistan, Pakistan and
Cambodia (see Table 1). New states in 2016 include Azerbaijan, Israel, Lebanon, Rwanda
and South Korea.

© Photo credit: MAG 2016

As in 2015, Ukraine and Mali were the states with most incidents in 2016, totalling
35 per cent of all incidents globally. Ukraine alone accounted for 37 incidents – a
significant increase compared to the 25 incidents the year before.

8
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In total, 423 casualties were recorded including 195 dead and 228 injured. This is a
decrease of 29 per cent compared to the previous year (598 casualties). The previous
trend was an increase in casualties and it is too early to say whether 2016 represents a
reversal of this trend or whether it was an outlier year. Corroborating last year’s GICHD
and SIPRI findings, the Landmine Monitor also registered a notable spike in AVM
casualties in 2015 compared to previous years.9
The vast majority of incidents recorded by the GICHD and SIPRI in 2016 occurred in
current conflict settings. 144 incidents (80 per cent) and 371 casualties (88 per cent) were
found in conflict settings.10 This is comparable to 2015, when 81 per cent of incidents
and 91 per cent of casualties were found in conflict situations.
Data also testify to the sustained – and proportionally growing – humanitarian and
developmental impact of AVMs in relation to other mines and explosive remnants of
war (ERW) in states long after conflict has ended. For example, while Cambodia noted
a 25 per cent drop in overall mines/ERW casualties from 2015 to 2016 (from 111 to 83),12
the number of AVM casualties remained fairly stable: 17 in 2015 and 16 in 2016.

HEAT MAP OF ALL STATES AND TERRITORIES WITH RECORDED
INCIDENTS IN 2016 11

FIGURE 2
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BOX 1

CASE STUDY SOUTH KOREA

For the first time in four years, an AVM incident was recorded in South Korea in 2016
– a further incident occurred only a few weeks later in January 2017. This is a reminder
of the legacy of contamination stemming from decades of military tensions.13
The Korean War from 1950 to 1953 ended with an Armistice Agreement.14
Since then, AVMs have posed a threat to both security forces and civilians. The
Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) and the Civilian Control Zone (CCZ)15 still remain among
the most mine-affected areas in the world due to extensive contamination by mines
laid during the Korean War, during the 1960s, as well as in 1978 and 1988. The CCZ is
still not safe for people to access,16 as many of these areas have no signs to indicate
where the mines are.17
The incident in 2016 occurred when an AVM was triggered during road construction
in the CCZ, killing a dump-truck driver, despite previous clearance work. The incident
drew renewed attention to the importance of demining in South Korea.18
FIGURE 3
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Figure adapted from Kwi-gon Kim and Dong-Gil Cho (2005), “Status and Ecological Resource
Value of the Republic of Korea’s De-militarized Zone”, Landscape and Ecological Engineering,
vol. 1, p. 4. Reproduced with permission from Springer
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CATEGORIES OF CASUALTIES
Categories of reported casualties (killed and injured) are represented in Figure 4.
Civilians overall accounted for 46 per cent of total casualties (196 out of 423), while
national security forces comprised 39 per cent (163 casualties).19 As in the previous year,
peacekeepers, international security forces, other combatants and unknown casualties
accounted for a smaller fraction of the total.20

FIGURE 4

CATEGORIES OF CASUALTIES 21

 	46%
Civilians
 	39%
National security forces
 	6%
Other combatants
 	5%
Peacekeepers
 	1%
International security forces
 	4%
Unknown

= 10 people

Absolute numbers are: 196 civilians (incl. 2 humanitarian personnel),
163 national security forces, 25 other combatants, 20 peacekeepers,
4 international security forces, 15 unknown
© GICHD – SIPRI

The percentage of overall civilian casualties decreased substantially from 60 per cent
in 2015 to 46 per cent in 2016, while a notable proportionate increase was observed
for casualties from national security forces from 28 per cent to 39 per cent in the same
period.

Global trends
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In conflict settings, civilians accounted for 62 per cent of casualties in 2015, where
disaggregated data were available (Figure 5). This figure dropped to 40 per cent in 2016.
In post-conflict situations, civilians accounted for 87 per cent of casualties in 2016
compared to 73 per cent the year before. This high ratio of civilian casualties in postconflict settings may be expected, since the presence of military personnel is typically
lower than in ongoing conflicts.

FIGURE 5

CASUALTY DEMOGRAPHICS IN CONFLICT VS POST-CONFLICT SETTINGS

2016
Civilian

Non-civilian

Conflict

40%

60%

Post-conflict

87%

13%

Absolute numbers are: (conflict) 144 civilians, 212 non-civilians;
(post-conflict) 45 civilians, 7 non-civilians
© GICHD – SIPRI

The impact of large incidents on data variance may also be noted. In 2015, one single
incident in Mali killed four and injured 28 civilians when a civilian bus detonated a
suspected AVM 45 km from Gao, near the village of N’Tillit. These 32 casualties alone
represented no less than 5 per cent of total casualties in 2015. The largest incident
recorded in 2016 occurred in the Donetsk region in Ukraine when a minibus hit a
suspected AVM, resulting in 15 civilian casualties.

12
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BOX 2

CASE STUDY UKRAINE

For two consecutive years, Ukraine has been the state with the most AVM-related
incidents and highest number of casualties. In 2016, the GICHD and SIPRI recorded
37 incidents with 101 casualties, including 43 dead and 58 injured. Ukraine therefore
accounted for 20 per cent of all recorded incidents and 24 per cent of all casualties
globally. Compared to 2015, this represents a 48 per cent spike in incidents and a
4 per cent increase in the number of casualties.
While old mines dating from World War I and World War II continue to be discovered
in Ukraine 22, recorded AVM incidents in 2016 took place in Luhansk and Donetsk
oblasts, where conflict between government and separatist forces erupted in 2014
(Figure 6).
AVM contamination affected
non-civilians in particular:
69 per cent of the casualties,
where disaggregation was
possible, which is higher
than the global average
of 60 per cent in conflict
contexts. This corroborates a
trend observed in 2015 when
64 per cent of the casualties
in Ukraine were non-civilians.

FIGURE 6

MAP OF AVM INCIDENTS IN UKRAINE
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an obstacle to the repair of AVM incidents: GICHD-SIPRI
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Agreements 24 by the Special Monitoring Mission of the Organization for Security
and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE).25
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CASUALTIES BY SEX AND AGE
The 2016 data reconfirm the challenges observed in the 2015 report. Sex-disaggregated
data were only available for 45 per cent (189 casualties) of total casualties in 83 incidents.
Where disaggregated data were available, men were disproportionaly affected

FIGURE 7

CASUALTIES BY SEX AND AGE
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© GICHD – SIPRI
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by AVMs: in 2016, 85 per cent of casualties were men in comparison to 93 per cent
in 2015. Traditionally high male representation among security forces, peacekeepers
and other combatants may explain this finding. The proportion of men, however, only
marginally decreases when considering only civilian casualties.
Age-disaggregated data were only accessible for 36 per cent (154 casualties) of total
casualties in 69 incidents. In these instances, 83 per cent were adults, while children 26
represented 17 per cent. These figures are in the same range as last year.27

CATEGORIES OF VEHICLES
Figure 8 illustrates that a civilian vehicle (agricultural, commercial and other civilian)
triggered the AVM in 49 per cent (84 incidents) of recorded incidents involving a vehicle
(173 incidents), while 57 per cent of incidents occurred with civilian vehicles in 2015.
This proportional decrease reflects the trend observed for civilian casualties. Still, like in
2015, civilian vehicles continue to be the most impacted in 2016, with a continued high
number of farming-related incidents. They are followed by vehicles belonging to national
security forces (24 per cent) and peacekeeping vehicles (8 per cent), for which the share
has only varied slightly over the last two years.

© Photo credit : Sean Sutton / MAG

A major spike was, however, recorded for humanitarian vehicles in both absolute and
relative terms: from one incident in 2015 (less than 1 per cent of all vehicle-related
incidents) to nine incidents in 2016 (5 per cent). A major part of this spike can be
attributed to the significant number of demining incidents in Iran (see Box 3).

Global trends
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Approximately 4 per cent (eight incidents) of recorded incidents did not involve a vehicle.
In these cases, AVMs were detonated when someone tried to remove the AVM from
the ground. In two incidents, one in Somalia and one in Angola, children were killed or
injured after finding AVMs on the ground. As in 2015, livestock also triggered AVMs.

FIGURE 8

CATEGORIES OF VEHICLES
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 	24%
National security
forces
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© GICHD – SIPRI
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CASUALTIES PER INCIDENT
Since AVMs are designed to destroy vehicles, they have a large explosive charge that
often causes several casualties. The average casualties per incident reached 2.3 in
2016 which is a decrease compared to 2015 (3.4 casualties per incident). This reduction
is mainly due to the lower number of casualties whereas the number of incidents
remained stable.
The ratio of casualties per incident varied depending on the context as well as between
states or territories (see Table 1). The type of vehicle, the number of passengers as well
as the victim’s activity at the time of the incident impact the likely number of casualties.
Previous high average casualty rates in Syria, Pakistan and Ukraine were again recorded
in 2016. However, among the seven states/territories with most incidents in both years
(i.e. Ukraine, Mali, Syria, Cambodia, Pakistan, Afghanistan and Western Sahara),
the average numbers decreased for six of them – with only Cambodia noting an increase.
In five instances (out of these six), the proportion of civilians amongst the casualties also
dropped.

© Photo credit: GICHD 2015

Syria accounted for the most significant decrease of civilian casualties, dropping from
93 per cent in 2015 to 45 per cent in 2016. A reverse trend was noted in Afghanistan
where the proportion of civilians among casualties spiked from 35 per cent to
100 per cent in one year; while the overall number of AVM casualties remained the
same (34), the number of incidents increased by 73 per cent between 2015 and 2016
with a recent prevalence in the south east regions. Possible factors for this trend

Global trends
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include internally displaced persons moving by road, due to recent fighting, without
knowledge of contamination or main roads being blocked by improvised explosive
devices (IEDs), resulting in the local population trying to use alternative roads that are
littered with AVMs.28

TABLE 1

Country /
Territory

CASUALTIES PER INCIDENT AND LETHALITY RATIO IN 2016
Recorded
incidents

Number
of casualties

Average No
casualties /
incident

Percent
of casualties that
were civilians

Percent
of casualties
that were killed

Ukraine

37

101

2.73

31%

43%

Mali

26

55

2.12

4%

29%

Afghanistan

19

34

1.79

100%

38%

Pakistan

18

52

2.89

40%

35%

Cambodia

16

16

1.00

100%

25%

Syria

12

38

3.17

45%

100%

Iran

11

9

0.82

100%

22%

Western Sahara

10

12

1.20

75%

25%

The 2016 data further indicate that the type of vehicle involved in an incident can cause
different impacts on casualties. Understood as the ratio of killed to overall victims,
the lethality rate of incidents with civilian vehicles (excluding humanitarian) reached
52 per cent overall, whereas the same rate of incidents involving non-civilian vehicles
amounted to 29 per cent.
This difference stems from the assumption that non-civilian vehicles (i.e. national security
forces, international security forces, peacekeepers, other combatants) are more likely to
be better armoured and to protect passengers from the effects of explosions than civilian
vehicles. Incidents without a vehicle reached a lethality ratio of 67 per cent.

18
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BOX 3

CASE STUDY IRAN

Iran illustrates how AVMs continue to pose a legacy threat. The 2016 data capture
the long-standing impact of contamination mainly from the conflict with Iraq in
1980-1988. Remaining contamination is concentrated in the five western regions
bordering Iraq, an area rich in oil fields; available estimations ranged from 250 km2
to 280 km2 in 2014.29
FIGURE 9

MAP OF AVM INCIDENTS IN IRAN
TURKMENISTAN
TURKEY

AFGHANISTAN
IRAQ

IRAN

PAKISTAN

Despite clearance efforts, AVM-related incidents still occur. The GICHD and SIPRI
recorded 11 AVM incidents in these regions in 2016 – a significant increase compared
to the previous year when three incidents were recorded. Over two years, two of
them occurred during construction work and one when an oil company’s tractor set
off an AVM in Musian County, Ilam province.
In 7 out of the 11 recorded incidents in 2016, AVMs were set off during clearance
work. This high number stands out and supports a broader trend of reported
demining incidents in Iran. According to the Landmine Monitor, one deminer
was killed and 17 injured in 2014, whereas 28 and 71 deminer casualties were
recorded in 2013 and 2012 respectively.30 While several factors testify to the
challenging environment of AVM clearance in that country, such as the prevalence
of non-metallic devices or possibly restricted access to technological advances in
demining assets,31 further research is required to understand the high number in
2016, from a larger quality management and occupational safety perspective.

Global trends
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FIGURE 10

CATEGORIES OF VEHICLES IN IRAN
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© Photo credit: Reza Haghshenas
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A locally developed demining tool that is installed in front
of a bulldozer in Iran

CONCLUSION

In 2016, the GICHD and SIPRI recorded 181 incidents related or suspected to be related
to AVMs in 22 countries and territories. This represents a 2 per cent increase of incidents
compared to 2015. These incidents caused 423 casualties, among which 228 were
injured and 195 killed – a 29 per cent reduction compared to the previous year. The
proportion of civilians among casualties dropped from 60 per cent to 46 per cent over
the two years.
The vast majority of the casualties in 2016 were suffered in conflict settings. This finding
bolsters the previous year’s observation: 80 per cent of incidents in 2016 (81 per cent
in 2015) and 88 per cent of casualties (91 per cent in 2015) occurred in those situations.
Notwithstanding, the 2016 findings also testify to the sustained humanitarian and
developmental impact of AVMs in post-conflict situations long after the conflict has
ended.
This report also highlights that in certain states and territories, like Cambodia, the number
of casualties due to AVM incidents has proportionally grown compared to the impact
of other mines and ERW.
For the second year in a row, the joint research by the GICHD and SIPRI sheds light on
an often-neglected humanitarian and developmental issue. AVM incident data remain
incomplete and their longer-term consistency and reliability continue to be a challenge,
particularly in conflict settings. As a consequence, actual figures on AVM incidents and
AVM-related casualties are expected to be higher than in the findings of this report.
Long-term and regular data collection is needed in order to identify trends, support
further analysis on the humanitarian and developmental impact of AVMs and contribute
to informed and evidence-based political discussions.

Conclusion
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ANNEX 1: RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
Research methodology
This research draws on data from states, typically national mine action authorities/
centres, as well as from mine action and other humanitarian organisations. These reports
were complemented by media reviews conducted in Arabic, English, French, Portuguese,
Russian, Spanish and Urdu. Press articles were included, either because an incident was
specially identified as AVM-related, or because an incident corresponded to a set of
criteria that strongly indicated an AVM-related incident. These included incidents such
as those on roads outside of a city involving a vehicle, but excluding remotely-detonated
bombs, and causing multiple casualties. In cases where the criteria strongly suggested
an AVM-related incident, the incident is referred to as a suspected AVM incident. In some
instances, mine action authorities and organisations were able to assess the relevance
and accuracy of retrieved press articles.
Incidents with an unknown number of casualties were categorised as incidents that
resulted in casualties, but without specifying any absolute number. For incidents referring
to a minimum number of casualties (“at least [number] casualties”), this minimum number
was retained in this research. Furthermore, unless clearly attributed in the source, the
vehicle category for incidents involving other combatants was defined as “unknown”.
This report provides an estimate of recorded AVM incidents and casualties in 2016,
but due to the various methodological challenges below, actual figures are expected
to be higher.
Data collection challenges
Data reported by states and organisations remain insufficient for a number of reasons.
In some instances, states with suspected AVM incidents do not release any information
at all. In other cases, data remain incomplete due to the inability of the national mine
action authority or organisations to access certain areas of the territory. This is at least a
challenge in current conflict areas where data collection and verification are particularly
difficult. The nature of these weapons, and the fact that AVM incidents often take place
in rural areas, also make their reporting challenging, specifically regarding the exact
location of incidents.
Reports from states and organisations generally provide much more accurate and
disaggregated information than media reports. Since the disaggregation of data is, to
a large extent, dependent on reports from states and organisations, data collection
becomes sensitive to the inactivity or closure of programmes due to a lack of funding or
to security concerns. This may, therefore, impact the ability to access detailed data from
22
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certain areas and analyse differences across years. The GICHD and SIPRI are continuously
engaging with new actors in country, specifically in conflict areas, in order to ensure the
most complete and long-term data availability.
Disaggregation of collected data on the type of device also proved to be a challenging
task. It is often difficult to identify an AVM after detonation, in particular if specific
circumstances, resources and the security situation do not allow a proper investigation
to take place. In 2016:
• 53 incidents (29 per cent) were categorised as confirmed AVM incidents

with an identified or likely mine type;
• 43 incidents (24 per cent) were categorised as confirmed AVM incidents

with an unknown device type;
• 85 incidents (47 per cent) were categorised as suspected AVM incidents.

An increased ratio of suspected AVM incidents compared to 2015, when 30 per cent
of incidents were suspected to be related to AVMs, can be noted due, in part, to higher
reliance on press articles in 2016.
Collecting disaggregated data on the sex and age of casualties remains a challenge.
In 2016, it was only possible to disaggregate by sex in 45 per cent and by age in
36 per cent of casualties. Sex-disaggregated data were available in 66 per cent of the
field reports while only 30 per cent of the press articles provided this information.
Finally, IEDs may function as AVMs.32 AVMs can also be used as energetic charges of
IEDs. This report is focused on industrial AVMs used in a conventional manner. Vehicleactivated IEDs are therefore excluded from these data.

Annexes
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ANNEX 2: NOTES AND REFERENCES
1

In this report, AVMs are defined as landmines designed to detonate by the presence, proximity or
contact of a vehicle. It covers a wide range of vehicles that operate on land including tanks. AVMs
are also commonly known as anti-tank mines as well as mines other than anti-personnel mines.

2

Casualties refer to individuals who were physically injured and/or killed.

3

SIPRI and GICHD (2014), The Humanitarian and Developmental Impact of Anti-Vehicle Mines.

4

The GICHD-SIPRI interactive maps are available at <http://www.gichd.org/avm>
(accessed: 22 February 2017).

5

SIPRI and GICHD (2016), Global Mapping and Analysis of Anti-Vehicle Mine Incidents in 2015.

6

Figures in this report are subject to rounding up/down.

7

The definition of territory rests on the United Nations definition of Non-Self-Governing Territories.

8

SIPRI and GICHD (2016), Global Mapping and Analysis of Anti-Vehicle Mine Incidents in 2015, p. 8.

9

The Landmine Monitor publishes data on anti-vehicle mine casualties every year. It recorded
468 casualties in 18 states and other areas in 2015, 218 casualties in 17 states and other areas
in 2014 and 212 casualties in 13 states and other areas in 2013. See International Campaign to
Ban Landmines (2016), Landmine Monitor 2016, p. 51; International Campaign to Ban Landmines
(2015), Landmine Monitor 2015, p. 28; International Campaign to Ban Landmines (2014), Landmine
Monitor 2014, p. 36. Note: Due to the GICHD and SIPRI undertaking a more focused and
disaggregated data collection on AVM incidents, comparison with Landmine Monitor data might
only be possible to a limited extent.

10 In this report, the definition of conflict setting is based on the Uppsala Conflict Data Program
(UCDP). The UCDP defines conflict as “a contested incompatibility that concerns government
and/or territory where the use of armed force between two parties, of which at least one is the
government of a state, results in at least 25 battle-related deaths in a calendar year” (see for
instance Wallensteen Peter and Sollenberg Margareta (2001), “Armed Conflict 1989 –2000”,
Journal of Peace Research 38(5), pp. 629–644). Due to the absence of UCDP data for 2016 at the
time of writing the present report, the GICHD and SIPRI defined a conflict setting in 2016 based
on whether there were more than 25 battle-related deaths in 2015 according to the UCDP. Using
this proxy definition for 2016, 15 states/territories were considered to be in a conflict setting
(Afghanistan, Azerbaijan, Chad, Egypt, India, Lebanon, Mali, Nigeria, Pakistan, Somalia, South
Sudan, Syria, Ukraine, Western Sahara, Yemen) and seven to be in a post-conflict phase (Angola,
Cambodia, Iran, Israel, Rwanda, South Korea, Tunisia). Although Western Sahara was missing
in the UCDP dataset that covers countries only, it was included in the list of states/territories in
a conflict setting in this report. The UCDP data are available at <http://ucdp.uu.se/downloads/>
(accessed: 28 February 2017). For more details on definitions, see UCDP/PRIO (2016),
Armed Conflict Dataset Codebook, Version 4-2016, at <http://ucdp.uu.se/downloads/ucdpprio/
ucdp-prio-acd-4-2016.pdf> (accessed: 28 February 2017).
11 All maps in this report are for illustrative purposes and do not imply the expression of any opinion
on the part of the GICHD/SIPRI concerning the legal status of any state or territory, or concerning
the delimitation of frontiers or boundaries. In addition, some incidents might appear as one
in country maps due to their geographical proximity and the scale of the maps.
12 The number of anti-personnel mine casualties also increased from 13 in 2015 to 26 in 2016.
See Landmine Monitor (2017), Cambodia Country Profile. Casualties and Victim Assistance,
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page updated as of 27 January 2017, at <http://the-monitor.org/en-gb/reports/2016/cambodia/
casualties-and-victim-assistance.aspx#ftnref3> (accessed: 15 March 2017); e-Mail from
Monoketya Nguon, Deputy Director Socio-Economic Planning and Database Management,
Cambodian Mine Action and Victim Assistance Authority, 9 March 2017.
13 For a recent article on the impact of landmines in the Korean DMZ, see for instance
Kim Eleana J. (2016), “Toward an Anthropology of Landmines: Rogue Infrastructure and Military
Waste in the Korean DMZ”, Cultural Anthropology, vol. 31, issue 2, pp. 162–187.
14 See United Nations Peacemaker, Agreement Concerning a Military Armistice in Korea,
at <http://peacemaker.un.org/koreadprk-militaryarmistice53> (accessed: 15 March 2017).
15 DMZ is the place formed by the Armistice Agreement that establishes that both Koreas should
retreat 2 km from the border. The area is not a place for residence or business and civilians are
prohibited from entering. CCZ is the area which extends 4 -10 km south of the border line, whose
initial purpose was to restrict civilian access. Over the years, some villages have now been built
and residents have settled there.
16 Mines Advisory Group, Norwegian People’s Aid and The HALO Trust (2016), Clearing the Mines
2016. A report by Mine Action Review for the Fifteenth Meeting of States Parties to the AntiPersonnel Mine Ban Convention, p. 302.
17 Park Kyung-nam (2015), “Area around the DMZ still strewn with 600,000 dangerous landmines”,
The Hankyoreh, 21 July 2015, at <http://english.hani.co.kr/arti/english_edition/e_national/701145.
html> (accessed: 15 March 2017).
18 Yonhap News Agency, [Anti-Vehicle Mine Exploded in the Construction Site in Cheorwon.
A Worker Died], 30 November 2016, Translation from Korean, at <http://www.yonhapnews.co.kr/
bulletin/2016/11/30/0200000000AKR20161130158052062.HTML?input=1195m>
(accessed: 15 March 2017).
19 The term ‘national security forces’ refers to national military, police and border guard personnel.
20 The term ‘international security forces’ refers to international armed forces who are present in a
conflict outside the mandate of a peacekeeping mission.
21 Due to rounding up/down, percentages of this breakdown figure may exceed 100 per cent.
22 Landmine Monitor (2016), Ukraine Country Profile. Mine Action, page updated as of 14 November
2016, at <http://www.the-monitor.org/en-gb/reports/2016/ukraine/mine-action.aspx>
(accessed: 15 March 2017).
23 Ibid.
24 Representatives of Ukraine, the Russian Federation, the Donetsk People’s Republic and
the Lugansk People’s Republic signed the Minsk Agreements aimed to stop the conflict in the
Donbass region. It was signed on 5 September 2014 and followed, in February 2015, by a package
of measures for the implementation of the Minsk Agreements (known as Minsk II). See for
instance Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, “OSCE Chairperson-in-Office
gives full backing to Minsk package”, 12 February 2015, at <http://www.osce.org/cio/140196>
(accessed: 20 March 2017).
25 See for instance Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, “Latest from the OSCE
Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine (SMM), based on information received as of 19:30,
17 March 2017”, 18 March 2017, at <http://www.osce.org/special-monitoring-mission-toukraine/306076> (accessed: 20 March 2017).
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26 In this report, the definition of children is based on article 1 of the Convention on the Rights
of the Child whereby children are considered to be persons below the age of eighteen years.
See Convention on the Rights of the Child, 1577 UNTS 27531.
27 SIPRI and GICHD (2016), Global Mapping and Analysis of Anti-Vehicle Mine Incidents in 2015, p. 11.
28 E-Mail from Abdul Qudos Ziaee, Operations R&D Manager, UNMAS Afghanistan, 22 January 2017.
29 Landmine Monitor (2015), Iran Country Profile. Mine Action, page updated as of 29 November 2015,
at <http://the-monitor.org/en-gb/reports/2015/iran/mine-action.aspx> (accessed: 15 March 2017).
30 Ibid.
31 Islamic Republic News Agency (IRNA), [Clearance of mine-affected areas will be completed this
year/Iran is ready to export its mine action services], 28 March 2012, Translation from Persian,
at <http://www.irna.ir/fa/News/128025/> (accessed: 22 March 2017).
32 There is no universally accepted definition of an IED. However, NATO for instance defines an IED as
“a device placed or fabricated in an improvised manner incorporating destructive, lethal, noxious,
pyrotechnic or incendiary chemicals and designed to destroy, incapacitate, harass or distract.
It may incorporate military stores, but is normally devised from non-military components”.
See NATO (2010), Glossary of Terms and Definitions, NATO document AAP-6(2010), p. 2-I-2.
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